Subcontracting agreements in Eastern Europe's car component industry by Møllgaard, Peter & Lorentzen, Jochen
 
 
 
 
EXCLUSIVE SAFEGUARDS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: 
Subcontracting Agreements in Eastern Europe’s Car Component Industry 
 
 
H. Peter Møllgaard 
Department of Economics, CBS 
Centre for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions at CBS 
Centre for Industrial Economics, University of Copenhagen 
hpm.eco@cbs.dk 
 
& 
 
Jochen Lorentzen 
Department of International Economics and Management 
Copenhagen Business School (CBS) 
Howitzvej 60 
DK-2000 Frederiksberg 
jl.int@cbs.dk 
 
First draft: December 2000. This version: August 2002 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We study the rationale for the use of exclusivity to protect transfer of technology in 
subcontracting agreements. The legal possibility arises through the EU Notice on 
Subcontracting. Empirically, the link between exclusive agreements and technology transfer 
among firms in the automotive supply industry in EU candidate countries is surprisingly weak, 
although with exclusive-supply or exclusive-buying clauses in subcontracting agreements 
upstream transfer of technology is more likely. Exclusive agreements are often reciprocal, and 
are typically passed on. Downstream firms are more likely to face and use vertical restraints. 
Technology trickles upstream: Multinational final assemblers transfer more technology than 
lower-tier suppliers.  
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Introduction 
 
To what extent are exclusivity clauses used to protect transfer of technology in 
subcontracting? In subcontracting relations the buyer (the downstream firm) commissions the 
seller (the upstream firm) to produce a certain quantity of a component or part that the buyer 
needs for further processing or resale. Such contracts often involve the transfer of intellectual 
property or technology from the buyer to the seller; hence the direction of technology transfer 
is up through the supply chain. Exclusivity clauses may protect both the downstream firm’s 
investment in technology and the upstream firm’s specific investment in adapting to the 
technology. Thus buyers as well as suppliers may be subject to exclusivity clauses. 
 
EU competition policy acknowledges this possibility. The 1978 Notice on 
Subcontracting represents the Commission's views on subcontracting and clarifies how it will 
evaluate such vertical agreements. In particular, the Notice mentions that: “[t]o carry out 
certain subcontracting agreements in accordance with the contractor's instructions, the 
subcontractor may have to make use of particular technology or equipment which the 
contractor will have to provide. In order to protect the economic value of such technology or 
equipment, the contractor may wish to restrict their use by the subcontractor to whatever is 
necessary for the purpose of the agreement. The question arises whether such restrictions are 
caught by Article [81(1)]" (EU Commission, 1978).1 
 
The Notice on Subcontracting applies when the buyer transfers equipment or know-
how to the seller so that the seller can provide the buyer with goods or services that differ 
from those found already on the market. The buyer may then restrict the use of the equipment 
or know-how and request that the seller supply the contract goods exclusively to the buyer. 
 
When firms employ vertical restraints (VRs) such as exclusive agreements the 
outcome may be pro- or anti-competitive. Ideally, an associated efficiency gain such as 
transfer of technology (TT) results. But exclusive agreements also lend themselves to the 
creation or abuse of market power, for example by allowing foreclosure of competing supply 
chains or by facilitating market sharing. Industry characteristics inform the frequency of 
exclusive agreements. Firms with knowledge-intensive operations have a greater need to 
protect their investments in innovative assets than those in sectors where technological 
progress is rare. Global and regional industry dynamics impact on the scope of VRs in 
relationships between suppliers and assemblers and among suppliers. Regulatory 
environments also influence vertical restraints. Rules are different between EU competition 
law and US anti-trust law. Outcomes will be different again in legislations without a 
competition law; where it is not enforced vigorously, or where such legislation is only 
emerging. Next to the supply of effective competition rules, demand for the protection of 
intellectual property rights may influence where, how, and why exclusive agreements come 
about. In sum, there is a common theoretical rationale for exclusive agreements. But their 
incidence and frequency is country- (or region-) and industry-specific. 
 
 This paper addresses the rationale underlying the Notice on Subcontracting 
theoretically and empirically. We first model theoretically how technology transfer may be 
protected by exclusivity and what such efficiency enhancing technology depends upon. We 
                                                           
1 Article 81(1) prohibits anti-competitive agreements. 
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then study the frequency and incidence of exclusive agreements in Eastern Europe’s car 
component industry: why do they happen; how typical are they for supply relationships 
between component manufacturers as well as between them and car assemblers; and how do 
they relate to the regulatory environment? Answers to these questions concern competition 
authorities in Eastern Europe and in the European Union (EU). In the context of EU 
enlargement, they also concern policymakers in Eastern Europe for VRs used by multinational 
firms in foreign direct investments (FDI) may affect the distribution of gains between 
countries. 
 
 Section 1 reviews the theoretical rationale for and empirical evidence of exclusive 
agreements. Section 2 illustrates industry trends in the international automotive supplier 
industry and in car component manufacturing in CEE that influence the structure of inter-firm 
relations. Section 3 describes how exclusive agreements are regulated in EU competition law 
and contrasts that with the emerging competition policy in Eastern Europe. Section 4 states the 
hypotheses and presents the research design along with a database of East European car 
component manufacturers. Section 5 discusses econometric results and insights from case 
studies. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
1 Technology transfer and vertical restraints 
 
Exclusive agreements are vertical restraints that can go in two directions. A firm may grant 
exclusivity to its customers and thus not sell to their competitors. Likewise it may request 
from its customers that they not deal in its rivals’ products. Hence in combination with 
upstream and downstream relations, four different types of exclusive agreements exist (see 
Figure 1). 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The reasons why a firm may grant or request exclusivity from either its suppliers (S) or 
its customers (C) are well known (see Rey and Caballero-Sanz (1996, 30-32) for a recent 
survey). For example, it may aim to protect a specific investment (in physical or human 
capital, technology or know-how), or to increase market power through vertical foreclosure or 
strategies that raise rivals’ costs. Bernheim and Whinston (1998) demonstrate that it depends 
on the setting whether exclusionary contractual provisions are irrelevant, anti-competitive, or 
efficiency enhancing. Exclusivity is irrelevant when a firm would unilaterally decide to deal in 
only one good. It is anticompetitive when downstream markets develop sequentially and 
upstream firms must serve more than one market, since this setting creates contracting 
externalities in the absence of exclusivity. Exclusivity then internalises the externality but 
leads to foreclosure of rivals. Finally, exclusivity enhances efficiency when the absence of 
exclusivity leads to incentive conflicts.  Rey and Stiglitz (1995) show that exclusive territories 
which eliminate intrabrand competition make the perceived demand curve less elastic. This 
causes producers to increase prices to the detriment of consumer surplus and welfare. Butz 
and Kleit (2001) argue that a combination of (time-limited) exclusivity and resale price 
maintenance may enhance efficiency because it increases returns to sales promotion by those 
who are in the best position to do so.  
 
 Exclusivity restrictions to protect intellectual property have been dealt with 
mainly in the context of licensing contracts. Gallini and Trebilcock (1998) review the trade-off 
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between giving incentives to innovate through patent legislation that allows the innovator a 
return from investing in research and development through a temporary monopoly, and 
competition legislation that aims at maximizing static welfare by introducing as much 
competition as possible. However, they argue against the presumption that an intellectual 
property right creates market power since the scope of a patent is not commensurate with the 
relevant market in antitrust. They further argue that a licensing restriction should in general be 
permitted if it is not anticompetitive compared with the situation in which the entire licence 
was not in place.  They review the mix of patent law and competition policy in Canada, the 
European Union and the United States and demonstrate that there is a clear right in these 
jurisdictions to offer exclusive licensing contracts but not necessarily to anybody, and in 
particular not to a rival in a concentrated market, since this could lead to de facto market 
sharing. The European Union is particular in that it does not allow absolute territorial 
exclusivity due to the market integration that is part of the raison d’etre of the EC Treaty.  Rey 
and Winter (1998) argue that in order to assess the welfare effects of exclusivity restrictions in 
licensing contracts three levels of activity must be evaluated: 1) research and development 
leading to innovation; 2) diffusion of innovation or transfer of technology; and 3) competition 
on product markets.  
 
 In this paper we focus on technology transfer between firms in subcontracting 
agreements and only discuss in passing how this affects the incentive to innovate. Thus for the 
most part we take the existence of the technology for granted and the question is whether it is 
transferred from a downstream firm to an upstream firm. A firm may transfer technology or 
know-how upstream in order to get a better or cheaper input. Likewise it may itself receive 
technology from its customers. This technology transfer will allow the recipient to upgrade its 
product. When the technology is received from a customer, it will typically require the 
recipient to tailor its product to that customer, who in turn may request that the technology not 
be used with rivals’ products by insisting on exclusivity in order to prevent free riding on the 
investment. In addition, if the two firms have to invest in specific (human) capital to carry out 
this upgrade, exclusive supply contracts may protect the downstream firm’s investment in 
innovation and transfer from being exploited by rivals. Similarly, exclusive dealing contracts 
protects the subcontractor’s specific investment from hold-up. Absent exclusivity, technology 
transfer and relation-specific investments tend to be undersupplied or will be replaced by 
equity links (vertical integration), since the implied transfer of residual rights would benefit 
those investments (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995). For example, if the product is traded 
between different firms in the same group, the equity link is likely to substitute for the 
exclusive agreement. González-Díaz, Arruñada & Fernández (2000) thus find that as 
specificity grows, firms tend to subcontract less. They tend to subcontract more, when output 
heterogeneity and the use of physical and human capital increases. 
 
 
 To fix ideas, we present a simple extension of a standard model of oligopoly. Two 
downstream firms, 1 and 2, engage in price competition with differentiated products. We 
assume that they face the following inverse demand curve: 
 
jijiqqp ijiii ≠=≥>>−−= ;2,1,,0,0, γβαγβα                     (1) 
 
where pi is the price set by firm i, qi is the corresponding number of units sold, αi is the 
demand intercept and, if different from αj, a measure of vertical product differentiation. The 
relation between the parameters γ and β measures how close (horizontal) substitutes the 
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products are. If γ/β is close to unity, products are almost perfect substitutes and price 
competition is fierce; if γ = 0, products are independent in demand and the downstream firms 
are essentially monopolists; if γ < 0, products are complements and the two firms are in fact 
not competitors but complementors. 
 
We assume that the marginal cost of downstream i is ci. How these costs are related to 
upstream firms will become apparent below. It may now be shown that, conditional on both 
firms being active, gross equilibrium profits are: 
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From (2) we observe that in this particular model a process innovation that leads to a 
reduction of ci of 1 will have the same effect on each firms profit as a product innovation that 
increases the vertical product differentiation parameter, αi, by 1. Such innovation will affect 
own profits positively: 
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and the rival's profits adversely: 
 
jijiq
dc
d
d
d
j
i
j
i
j ≠=<






−
−=
Π
−=
Π
;2,1,;0
2
11
2
1
2
β
γ
β
γ
α
                                                     (4) 
 
If both firms get access to the technology so that dαi = dαj and/or dci = dcj , then the 
effect on the equilibrium profits is positive and equal to 
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Total industry profits go up if the technology is disseminated to all industry participants, but 
the innovator will profit more if the supplier agrees to exclusivity in the delivery contract. 
Thus, if the innovator is free to choose, she will contract for technology against exclusive 
supply. If there are any costs involved in transferring the technology to the supplier, it may 
clearly be the case that technology is only transferred upstream provided that exclusivity be 
guaranteed. 
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Assume for simplicity that there are many potential upstream producers of components 
that ex ante are equally efficient. Without transfer of technology each of them would have to 
undertake a relationship-specific investment of size K to adjust their production to work with a 
particular downstream customer. Any supplier would then have a marginal cost of c and their 
input would lead downstream firms to produce a vertical quality of α. Since there are many 
upstream firms, downstream firms will be able to negotiate a contract that keeps any upstream 
firm at normal (or zero) profits: This may be done by means of a two-part pricing scheme that 
is optimally set such that the fixed payment covers K while the per-unit payment is exactly c. 
Thus without technology transfer, downstream net equilibrium profits are really Πi(α,α,c,c) - 
K, i = 1,2. 
 
Assume now that downstream firm 1 possesses a technology that – if transferred to its 
upstream subcontractor – will either give rise to improved vertical product differentiation (α’ 
> α ) or to a lowering of the marginal cost of producing the component (c’ < c) or both. 
Assume that it costs downstream firm 1 τ to transfer the technology. This amount could for 
example represent the management or engineering time spent on explaining the technology or 
the knowhow to the upstream firm. With no exclusivity, the upstream firm will surely use the 
technology with the other downstream firm, since it represents a competitive advantage over  
other upstream firms. In this case firm 1’s profit will be Π1(α’,α’,c’,c’) – K – τ. 
 
 Finally, we note that if the contract foresees exclusive supply as a precondition for the 
transfer of the technology, then firm 1 will get net profits of Π1(α’,α,c’,c) – K – τ, so we expect 
to see technology transfer protected by exclusive supply since it follows from (4) that   
 
Π1(α’,α’,c’,c’) – K – τ < Π1(α’,α,c’,c) – K – τ                                                                      (6) 
 
Note that the left-hand side of (6) may well be negative while the right-hand side is positive 
when products are fairly homogeneous and competition thus fierce (γ/β is close to unity). In 
that case the technology transfer will not happen without exclusive supply clauses. Also 
observe that firm 1 has an alternative to subcontracting with exclusive supply: not to transfer 
technology. This will be optimal when 
 
Π1(α’,α,c’,c) – K – τ  < Π1(α,α,c,c) – K                                                                                   (7) 
 
Thus we expect to observe exclusive supply subcontracting with technology transfer only if 
the technology allows the receiver to upgrade product or process significantly.  
 
This section reviewed the theoretical rationale behind exclusivity to protect technology 
transfer and related investments in subcontracting agreements. The next section gives a brief 
account of industry characteristics of car component manufacturing. 
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2 The Scope for Vertical Restraints in the Automotive Sector 
 
In the 1990s cost reduction strategies by car assemblers changed the car component industry. 
Outside sourcing increased, ultimately raising the size and the scope of the suppliers of key 
components. The interdependence of assemblers and suppliers intensified even though 
carmakers sold off their component arms. Longer-term relationships through global supply 
deals replaced annual bidding contests in which carmakers tried to play their suppliers off 
against each other. Assemblers began to allow suppliers earlier access to new vehicle design in 
order to pass on R&D projects they did not want to do themselves (Lewis & Wright, 1999). 
Consolidation in the industry promoted the emergence of fewer but increasingly powerful 
component suppliers, so-called system integrators; this, in turn, shifted the bargaining between 
suppliers and assemblers in favour of the former. In components, the fastest growth area is 
electronic on-board systems, an example of the rising technological contribution to the value 
of a car. It suggests that the scope for technology sharing – between assemblers and system 
integrators – and technology transfer – between one or both of the former and lower-tier 
suppliers – is on the rise (Bursa et al., 1997; Virag & Mount, 1998). Opportunities for 
investments in relation-specific assets are likely to increase, with attendant consequences for 
the use of vertical restraints. 
 
The automotive sector in CEE is highly integrated with the world, and especially 
European, car industry. Car and car component manufacturing consistently attracted a large 
share of the sectoral distribution of inward direct investment (UNCTAD, 1999). Western 
component manufacturers followed car assemblers to the East in exchange for the promise of 
potentially group-wide supply contracts. To this end, they acquired or teamed up with local 
firms, thus facilitating the consolidation of the formerly moribund eastern automotive industry 
into internationally competitive manufacturers of both cars and components. In the second half 
of the 1990s, trade in parts became the fastest growing component of CEE’s external trade; of 
this, automotive parts were the most important. For example, in Poland their share in total 
exports and imports of parts to the EU rose by about 60 per cent in 1993-7. The import and 
export share of components and final assemblies in this sector also increased (21 per cent for 
imports from and fourfold for exports to the EU in the case of Poland). This suggests that 
many producers in CEE have become part of an intra-product division of labour organised 
around networks centred in the EU (Kaminski & Ng, 1999; see also Eichengreen & Kohl, 
1998). The emergence of these networks through foreign direct investments and intra- or inter-
firm trade opens up possibilities for technology transfer and, thus, lends itself to making use of 
vertical restraints. The presence of East-West supply networks means that products of East 
European manufacturers may end up on West European markets. They thus become a 
potential concern for EU competition authorities. The next section explains the relevant legal 
basis. 
 
 
3 Exclusivity and technology transfer in European competition policy 
 
The European Commission (1978) exempts from the general prohibition of anti-competitive 
restraints – embodied in Article 81(1) of the Treaty of Amsterdam – exclusive agreements 
provided they cover products whose manufacture requires making use of a firm’s proprietary 
knowledge, machinery, or equipment. Article 81(1) does a priori not apply to a sub-
contracting agreement through which the sub-contractor receives intellectual property rights, 
know-how, documents, dies, or tools belonging to the contractor as long as the subcontractor 
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uses these assets to manufacture a product that differs with respect to form, functionality, or 
composition from the product found on the (spot) market. It is thus material to the a priori 
presumption of legality that exclusivity be granted in return for a (broadly defined) transfer of 
technology. 
 
Furthermore, the subcontractor (or supplier) must not already be an independent 
producer of the product covered by the agreement and not be able to source the technology 
freely elsewhere. Instead, he must use technical knowledge, designs, or other specific 
documentation provided by the contractor (or customer), allowing him to manufacture a 
different product. Stipulations that the subcontractor must use the technology or equipment 
exclusively for the purposes of the contracting agreement and/or that goods or services 
resulting from the technology transfer may only be supplied to the contractor do not violate 
Article 81 if the above conditions are met. It is thus important for firms wanting to impose 
exclusive agreements that they can rationalise them in terms of technology transfer. For 
further discussion of the Commission’s Notice, see Goyder (1993, 301-3) and Van Bael & 
Bellis (1990, Appendix 42). 
 
In light of enlargement, EU regulation of VRs is becoming increasingly important for 
Eastern Europe. Candidate countries must adopt the acquis communautaire prior to accession. 
Therefore they are modeling their competition laws on the EU Treaty. That is difficult in 
itself. Effective enforcement is even more difficult. For obvious reasons, competition policy 
has no tradition in the transition economies. Rules and regulations against the abuse of market 
power have been slow in coming. According to the EBRD’s review of a decade of transition 
(1999), competition legislation and enforcement capabilities have made the least progress of 
all market reforms in Eastern Europe over the last decade. Despite gradual legislative 
convergence towards EU law in the current pre-accession phase, competition culture in 
Eastern Europe is still rudimentary (Dutz and Vagliasindi 2000, Møllgaard and Lorentzen 
2001). This was even more so in the beginning of the transition when European multinationals 
(MNEs) began to invest in the East. They did so in a regulatory environment that was clearly 
different both from their home environment and from the rules that will govern competition in 
the candidate countries at the very latest just prior to joining the EU. It is still the case that 
Eastern Europe’s car component manufacturers are largely ignorant of or do not care about 
competition rules regarding vertical restraints. To the extent this spills over into business 
practices, the contracts that we observe empirically provide a laisser-faire benchmark that 
may be an indication of how such contracts would look in the EU if they were not regulated by 
competition rules. 
 
 
4 Research design and data 
 
In this section we explain our data and research design. The data are based on a survey and 
case studies of car component manufacturers in six East European countries (see Appendix A 
for the survey questionnaire). In late 1999 and through the spring of 2000, the questionnaire 
went to all Polish firms with more than 20 employees that the National Statistical Office, in 
accordance with NACE codes, classifies as car component manufacturers. In Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, the respective trade associations permitted access 
to their membership directories. The survey covers all the relevant locations of the automotive 
supply sector in the candidate countries, accounting for the bulk of Eastern Europe’s 
automotive supply output and export. The country-weighted average return rate is close to 50 
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per cent. Local teams obtained this high rate through intense follow-up phone canvassing. The 
questionnaire contains 24 questions on exclusive agreements and technology transfer, and 
other international business variables. Most responses are binary (YES/NO); some are on an 
integer Likert scale from 1 to 5; one is a percentage; while a few are not easily codifiable. 
Local partners translated the questionnaire from the original English version into their local 
language. As a test of the reliability of the translations native speakers unknown to the local 
partners translated the questionnaires back into English. Appendix B provides a summary of 
descriptive statistic of the data. 
 
From the previous sections we derive three hypotheses: 
 
1 Technology transfer is more likely if protected by exclusivity clauses. 
 
Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of technology transfer to suppliers (TTS) should increase if the 
responding firm (to our questionnaire) requests exclusivity that its supplier grants (ERS). 
Similarly, the likelihood of technology transfer to the respondent firm from its customers 
(TTC) should increase if it agrees to their exclusivity requests (ECR). 
 
2 If technology transfer involves relationship-specific investments, it is protected by 
exclusivity or internalised through equity links. 
 
The presence of exclusivity clauses should relate positively with the complexity of the product 
or R&D in the case of TT but not when none takes place. This is on the assumption that more 
complex products require more relationship-specific investments. Further, customers should 
transfer less technology if the respondent firm is owned by a multinational (or foreign) firm 
since global players are more advanced than domestically-owned firms. 
 
3 Where competition is more intense, exclusivity is likely to protect technology transfer. 
 
Section 1 showed that more competition would make it less likely that technology is 
transferred unless protected by exclusivity. What matters here is in what sorts of generic 
inputs, components, or parts respondent firms produce; in which markets they sell them; and 
what competition in these markets looks like. 
 
The two key variables, exclusivity and technology transfer, are binary. They take on 
the values YES (1) and NO (0). This means that tests of our hypotheses use logit models (see 
Hutcheson & Sofroniou (1999) for an introduction and Liao (1994) for a guide on how to 
interpret probability models such as the logit model). 
 
The (multiple) logit model is specified as 
 
where Pr(y = 1) is the probability that the response variable takes on the value 1 (as opposed 
to 0), B0 is the coefficient to the constant and Bi is the coefficient to the i’th explanatory 
variable xi. The interpretation of the model is that the odds may be written as 
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where  x = (x1, x2, … xk) is the vector of explanatory variables. Thus if B1 is negative the odds 
of observing y = 1 decrease as the explanatory variable increases ceteris paribus. If, for 
example, B1 = -.6931 so that eB1 = .5, then the odds of observing y = 1 is half as big if x1 = 1 as 
when x1 = 0. The tables below report both B1 and eB1. Many of the explanatory variables are 
themselves binary or take on integer values on a Likert scale. In this case the corresponding 
eB1 may be interpreted as the change in the odds of y = 1 that follows from the presence of the 
attribute represented by x1 or from an increase by one unit in the attribute represented by the 
scale, respectively. 
 
 
5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Firms export 44 per cent of what they produce. They sell mostly to final assemblers (who are 
often MNEs), but half of them sell to suppliers and a relatively large number sells directly to 
retailers (in the aftermarket). Note that a respondent firm may have several types of customers 
(i.e. both final assemblers and other suppliers). Domestic ownership is predominant with two 
thirds of the cases. Firms source mostly both at home and abroad. Technology is an important 
characteristic of automotive supply networks in Eastern Europe. 61 per cent of the sample 
receive technology, and 47 per cent transfer. Roughly two thirds of the firms engage in some 
form of R&D. However, on average products are regarded as only weakly complex. 
Exclusivity is also widespread. It is more frequent the closer the supply chain gets to final 
assembly. Thus, customers request exclusivity from the respondent in 36 per cent of the cases 
and the respondent in turn requests it from its customers in 19 per cent of the cases. Similarly, 
customers are subject to exclusivity requests by respondents – and, respectively, respondents 
to those by suppliers – in roughly half as many cases. The unconditional probability that a 
respondent firm has no experience with exclusivity at all is 39 percent. This demonstrates that 
TT and VRs are frequent phenomena in Eastern Europe’s automotive component industry. 
 
 
5.2 Econometric findings 
 
Support for the three hypotheses is mixed. Some findings support and some contradict the 
hypothesised links between exclusivity and technology transfer, the importance of complexity 
for exclusive clauses in subcontracting, and the significance of the degree of competition. 
Upstream observations approach the hypothesised relationships more than those downstream. 
What matters for technology transfer is, prominently, the strategic importance of technology 
as perceived by individual firms; a supply relation with multinational firms and final 
assemblers; and multinational control qua ownership over these supply networks. What 
matters for exclusivity is mostly a tit-for-tat – firms that impose exclusivity are also subject to 
it. A key finding is that the abuse of exclusivity clauses for anti-competitive purposes seems to 
be more of a “family affair” in the sense that it mostly involves East European, as opposed to 
international firms. A detailed discussion of the results follows. 
 
 The first two logit models explain the occurrence of technology transfer to suppliers 
(TTS) and from customers (TTC). The latter four explain the use of the corresponding 
safeguard exclusivity clauses, ERS and ECR, respectively, conditional on the presence and 
absence of technology transfer. 
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The first logit regression analyzes the link between technology transfer to suppliers, 
exclusivity clauses with suppliers, and other relevant variables included in the questionnaire. 
TTS occurred in 46.9 percent of 409 cases (see Table 1 and Appendix C for more details). The 
most noteworthy finding is that the safeguard exclusivity clause (ERS: exclusivity requested 
by the respondent and granted by the supplier) does not enter the regression significantly. On 
the other hand, the opposing safeguard, ESR, that might protect the supplier’s relationship-
specific investment in adapting to the technology, does enter with the right sign and is 
borderline significant. There is collinearity between these two variables. Without ERS, ESR 
becomes significant at a 5-percent level; if ESR is left out, the p-value of ERS is 0.136. This 
weakly confirms the first hypothesis. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The two sources of technology, namely technology received from customers (TTC) 
and own R&D, are highly significant. This means that technology recipients or generators are 
three to four times more likely to transfer technology to their own suppliers. Product 
complexity matters, too, but is weakly insignificant. This is due to multicollinearity with 
R&D.2 If R&D is left out in the TTS regression, complexity becomes significant at a level of 
0.03.  Furthermore, if the respondent is part of a multinational corporation, the firm is twice as 
likely to transfer technology to its suppliers. Multinationals are thus not only an important 
locus of technology generation but an engine of technology diffusion through the supply 
chain. These findings are consistent with our second hypothesis.3 
 
Further results illustrate the significance of the structure and dynamics of supply 
chains and the position respondent firms occupy therein. Firms that accord strategic 
importance to the technology they receive from customers are more likely to transfer 
technology on to their suppliers (Upgrade). Thus, technology is on the move through the 
supply chain rather than being relegated to upper-tier firms only. Multinational customers 
exert a push effect on technology diffusion because they, along with customers that are final 
assemblers, make it more likely that technology is kept on the move rather than exhausted at 
any level of the supply hierarchy (Customer is MNE).4 By contrast, the extent to which firms 
concentrate more on the domestic market influences how likely they are to transfer technology 
to their suppliers (Mktdom). They are also less likely to transfer technology to 
(predominantly) foreign suppliers who, certainly during the 1990s and also for the time being, 
are more advanced than their East European counterparts. Hence, along with international 
ownership, international focus matters for the technology intensity of supply relationships.5 
 
 
                                                           
2 Indeed, an independent logit model (not reported) explaining R&D shows that an increase in perceived 
complexity by one unit on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 raises the odds of R&D. 
3 Competition (Compdom and Compglobal) is not significant (and not reported in Table 2 where it is 
insignificant, too). But this does not reject the third hypothesis which proposed that TT is more likely to be 
protected through exclusivity in the presence of competition. For a fuller treatment see below. 
4 MNEs and final assemblers among customers are significantly and positively correlated (not reported here). 
5 The regression also shows that TTS is less likely the more the respondent agrees that “capabilities and 
competencies of suppliers are high” (Good suppliers); and more likely if it finds that “Relationships between 
suppliers and buyers are strong” (Good relations). This may be a bit of a tautology: If you transfer technology to 
your suppliers, relationships with these are strong, and the other way round. However, it may also indicate a 
positive role for long-term vertical relations for technology transfer. 
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The second logit regression has the same structure as the first except that it substitutes 
TTS through TTC, namely technology transfer from customers. TTC occurred in 60.9 percent 
of 409 cases (see Table 2 and Appendix D for more details). The most noteworthy finding is 
that the safeguard exclusivity clauses, ECR and ERC, do not enter the regression significantly 
and have the wrong sign. There is collinearity between these two variables. Without ERC, 
ECR achieves a p-value of 0.118; if ECR is left out, ERC obtains a p-value of 0.234. In both 
cases, the sign is negative. This contradicts our first hypothesis. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Another unexpected result is that product complexity and R&D are insignificant and 
have the wrong sign. Eliminating one of these variables does nothing much for the 
significance of the other, respectively. On the other hand, firms that are part of MNEs receive 
less TTC (Part of MNE).  One way to interpret this is that they receive it from their parents 
instead of from independent customers. This is consistent with the second hypothesis because 
being part of an MNE constitutes an equity link that protects intra-group transfers of 
technology and obviates the need for exclusivity clauses. Firms with mostly foreign 
competitors are also less likely to receive technology from their customers. Since foreign 
competitors are on the whole more competitive than East European suppliers, this does not 
contradict the third hypothesis (but of course does not confirm it, either) which states that 
more competitive markets increase the likelihood that TT is accompanied by exclusivity 
clauses. As in the upstream regression (TTS), the strategic perception of technology (Upgrade) 
matters for TT, and so do MNE and final assembler customers (Customer is MNE).6 
 
So far, evidence of the link between TT on the one hand and exclusivity and other 
relevant variables on the other, is mixed at best. This calls for a more detailed analysis of the 
use of exclusivity. The two safeguards most easily defendable on efficiency grounds are ERS 
(for TTS) and ECR (for TTC). In the following two regressions the sample is split according 
to whether technology transfer takes place or not.  
 
 [Table 3 about here] 
 
Exclusivity requested by the respondent and granted by a supplier (ERS) happens in 
only 7.5 percent of the cases (see Table 3 and Appendix E). The results indeed mostly show 
that different variables are associated with ERS depending on the presence of TTS. A 
prominent exception is the countervailing safeguard, ESR. Hence, exclusivity clauses are 
reciprocal regardless of the incidence of technology transfer to suppliers. Technology-related 
variables such as R&D, complexity, and TTC do not matter when TTS takes place. By 
contrast, one of them – technology transferred by the customers – does matter in the absence 
of TTS. This may mean that downstream assemblers impose choices regarding the identity of 
lower-tier firms with whom their immediate suppliers may contract. In any event, these 
findings clearly contradict the second hypothesis. 
 
Downstream exclusivity (ERC, ECR) tends to get passed on with TTS. By contrast, 
without TTS exclusivity appears an upstream phenomenon only. This suggests that 
downstream firms – with a higher percentage of foreign firms, MNEs, and final assemblers – 
                                                           
6 MNEs and final assemblers among customers are significantly and positively correlated (not reported here). 
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fit more easily into an efficiency explanation whereas lower-tier suppliers – with a higher 
percentage of domestically-owned firms – do not. Together with additional evidence reviewed 
below, this means that the abuse of exclusivity clauses appears homemade rather than 
imported. 
 
What matters also is where customers and suppliers are located. As in the first 
regression, where global focus was important in explaining TTS, here it matters in explaining 
ERS. Firms that supply customers anywhere outside the key regional and international 
markets are less likely to impose exclusivity on their suppliers (MktROW). By definition they 
must be marginal suppliers outside of global supply networks, and thus there are fewer quality 
constraints on whom they source from. Absent TTS, the use of exclusivity depends on the 
firms’ position in the supply chain. The more local their suppliers (SourceDom), the smaller 
their customers (CustSuppliers), and the more local their competitors (RivalDom), the more 
likely they are to impose exclusivity clauses. This clearly does not square with an efficiency 
explanation of exclusivity; abuse of market power is a more convincing explanation. This 
contradicts the first hypothesis. 
 
Exclusivity requested by the customer and granted by the respondent (ECR) occurred 
in 36.3 percent of the cases (see Table 4 and Appendix F). As previously, reciprocity rules 
regardless of whether or not respondent firms receive technology from customers (ERC). 
Complexity matters, too, but opposite to what was expected; it makes ECR more likely only in 
the absence of TTC.7 This contradicts the second hypothesis. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 With TTC, ECR is more likely, if the domestic market (MktDom) is more important. 
This again shows that exclusivity is more of a domestic than an international phenomenon. 
Being part of a multinational corporation on the other hand reduces the likelihood of being 
subject to exclusivity clauses by customers, independently of whether the customers transfer 
technology or not. This probably has to do with the an improved bargaining position that 
follows from being part of a multinational, or because respondent (affiliate) firms sell to their 
headquarters. 
 
In sum, exclusivity is often unrelated to transfer of technology. Transfer to suppliers 
does increase if protected by exclusivity clauses (ESR or ERS). But the likelihood of receiving 
technology from customers is not significantly related to exclusive safeguards (ECR or ERC). 
Technology from own R&D or received from customers (TTC) results in more technology 
being transferred further upstream (TTS). International customers and especially MNEs and 
final assemblers affect technology transfer positively. The higher the strategic importance of 
technology for a firm’s own product or process improvements, the more likely it is that the 
firm that makes this judgement transfers technology further. Exclusivity requests are likely to 
be reciprocated and passed on upstream. Absent TT, the use of exclusivity clauses is 
predominantly a domestic problem. It is more likely if suppliers are domestic; if customers are 
other suppliers (and that means, relatively small); if main rivals are domestic; and if the 
domestic market is more important. This suggests that the involved firms are unaware that 
                                                           
7 One explanation for this could be that conditioning on TTC = 1 takes all technology related explanations out of 
that subsample but that some are left in the subsample for which TTC = 0. More complex products require better 
coordination such as relationship-specific investments between downstream and upstream firms and, hence, 
vertical restraints even in the absence of transfer of technology. 
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they may breach local competition rules, or that they are rationally breaching rules that at 
present are not vigorously enforced. 
 
 
5.3 Case Studies 
 
To throw further light on the puzzle of why the evidence of the link between TT and 
exclusivity clauses appeared so mixed, firms that had reported VRs were contacted in Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. More than 30 case studies are summarised here. 
Interviews in the four countries were held in the same format (see Appendix G). They focused 
on 
• the way in which complexity, technology transfer, and vertical restraints are related 
• how firms bargain about exclusive agreements 
• what determines each party’s bargaining position 
• the direction and extent of efficiency gains. 
 
The interviewed firms broadly fall into three categories. Two of these actually or 
potentially enhance efficiency while one has anti-competitive effects. In the first group, firms 
impose VRs to protect TT. Hence, the transfer and the restraint have the same direction. These 
cases confirm the efficiency explanation of exclusive agreements. In the second group, firms 
transfer technology to their suppliers. This requires the recipient firm to invest, for example in 
equipment, to be able to put the transferred technology to work. To insure itself against hold-
up by the transferring firm, the supplier then imposes exclusivity. Thus, technology transfer 
and vertical restraints do not have the same direction in these cases. However, as in the first 
group, the effect of the exclusivity condition is likely to be pro-competitive. In the third group, 
firms do not transfer technology but demand exclusivity all the same. Indeed, these firms that 
impose or are subject to VRs confirm that product complexity, a low relative distance to the 
international technology frontier, or proprietary technology assets are not at all associated with 
the exclusivity of which they are part. 
 
Insofar as they are on the receiving end of VRs, this raises the question why firms would 
subject themselves to such an asymmetric arrangement. Not much choice, is the answer. For 
firms in a sorry financial state or with the need to build up a relationship with a potentially 
large customer, there are no first-best alternatives, and so they go for second-best. This means, 
inter alia, extremely unfavourable sourcing conditions and restrictions on their customer base 
in exchange for guaranteeing some degree of capacity utilisation, plus in the best cases access 
to new markets, increases in productivity and profitability, or simply a breathing space for 
restructuring. For the individual firm, this sometimes turns out to be less onerous over time 
because with an improving bargaining position it manages to renegotiate the stipulations of 
the exclusive agreement. 
 
This summary glimpse at results from our case studies confirms a number of insights 
hinted at in the econometric analysis. First, exclusivity in inter-firm relationships exists even 
in the absence of technology transfer. Firms that impose them do so because exclusivity 
allows them to increase market power. Firms that accept them do so either because the 
alternative is bankruptcy or because the potential VR partner insists on it – a first-best 
alternative is unavailable. Second, VRs may lead to higher prices. Third, when they lead to 
lower prices, it is not clear from our analysis whether these gains are passed on down the 
value chain to the final user. Fourth, the terms of the VR depend on the relative bargaining 
 14
power of each party to the agreement. In East-West business relationships, as firms in 
transition economies restructure successfully, their control over resources may change over 
time, and with this the terms of the VR. The graduation away from VRs unassociated with 
technology transfer does not guarantee a more competitive market (only a different 
distribution of profits), but it does make it more likely. Fifth, competition authorities in 
Eastern Europe as well as the European Commission appear to be largely unaware of these 
practices. None of the sample firms had notified the respective authorities of its VR 
agreement, and only one professed to be familiar with the relevant legislation. Sixth, in the 
area of competition policy, the institutional remake of Eastern Europe has some way to go 
before it resembles EU practice. VR agreements are typically tacit rather than formalised into 
contracts. Dawnraids are no answer if anti-competitive practices never make it onto a – 
however well hidden – piece of paper. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Our main results are, loosely put, that exclusive agreements are an important feature of 
contracts in Eastern Europe’s automotive supply industry. Furthermore, in a laisser-faire 
environment, TT only partially justifies exclusive agreements. Efficiency is only one motive 
behind vertical restraints. Other factors explain why and how they come about. Exclusive 
agreements come in bundles, are to some extent reciprocal, and are passed on up- or 
downstream. When faced with a request for exclusivity by its customer, a firm seems likely to 
respond in kind. Also, the imposition of exclusive agreements at one point of the value chain 
appears to translate into other exclusivity clauses further up or further down, thus linking 
different tiers of suppliers and assemblers. First-tier suppliers are more prone to request 
exclusivity from their customers – because asset specificity rises downstream – while lower-
tier suppliers are more likely to request it from their suppliers – because technological 
intensity falls downstream. Likewise, firms that are technology recipients are more likely than 
those that are not to also pass on knowledge to other firms. Both of these findings suggest that 
technological competence is diffused along the automotive value chain, especially among 
upper-tier suppliers and assemblers, and that firms organise in networks. 
  
 Exclusivity and technology transfer are only weakly linked. If the supplier or the 
respondent requests exclusivity, then the respondent is more likely to transfer technology to 
suppliers. Domestically, the rationale for exclusivity is often not the protection of technology 
or knowledge transfer but rather the protection of market power or the use of bargaining 
power to influence the cui bono in inter-firm relations. In other cases – this is the benign 
version – the protection is merely aimed at assuaging hold-up problems and thus without anti-
competitive intent. Some evidence exists that R&D or complexity matter to the exclusivity 
that the respondent requests of customers in which case it may be efficiency enhancing or pro-
competitive. 
 
That exclusivity in contracts and TT do not explain each other more strongly was an 
unexpected result that may herald a problem for car assemblers and component suppliers. 
With pre-accession in full swing (and, thus, the gradual extension of EU law in CEE) firms 
had better think hard about the justification for exclusive agreements. For competition 
authorities will surely ask questions about them. 
 
For business practice and public policy, this translates into a series of challenges. 
Regulators need to understand the cause and the impact of vertical restraints. Managers in 
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Eastern Europe of multinational and of domestic firms need to ensure that exclusive 
agreements they struck in the past adhere to EU law. The impact and the legality of vertical 
restraints prominently depend on the extent to which they are linked to technology transfer. 
For policymakers and local managers in Eastern Europe, vertical restraints ideally foster the 
embeddedness of foreign firms and support local capabilities of product or process 
improvements. For foreign investors, they ideally protect their knowledge assets in what 
continue to be relatively risky markets. 
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Figure 1. – Four types of exclusive agreements 
 
Upstream firm (Supplier, S) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Firm at hand (Respondent, R) 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Downstream firm (Customer, C) 
 
Note: Questions 5.1-4 refer to our survey of which more below. 
ERS 
Exclusivity 
requested by R, 
granted by S 
(Question 5.4) 
ESR 
Exclusivity 
requested by S, 
granted by R 
(Question 5.3) 
ECR 
Exclusivity 
requested by C, 
granted by R 
(Question 5.1) 
ERC 
Exclusivity 
requested by R, 
granted by C 
(Question 5.2) 
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Table 1. – Preferred logit regression explaining technology transfer to suppliers (TTS) 
 
Xi 
 
Bi 
 
S.E. 
 
z-Statistic 
 
Sig. 
 
Exp(Bi) 
   
Constant -2.451 0.846 -2.898 0.004 0.086
TTC 1.112 0.281 3.957 0.000 3.042
ESR 0.500 0.317 1.576 0.115 1.649
ERS 0.453 0.491 0.923 0.356 1.573
   
Complexity 0.181 0.113 1.591 0.112 1.199
Compdom -0.128 0.091 -1.409 0.159 0.880
Compglobal -0.127 0.119 -1.067 0.286 0.881
R&D 1.431 0.263 5.442 0.000 4.184
Upgrade 0.173 0.101 1.716 0.086 1.189
   
Part of MNE 0.753 0.292 2.582 0.010 2.123
Foreign suppliers -0.880 0.349 -2.524 0.012 0.415
Good suppliers -0.220 0.125 -1.754 0.079 0.803
Good relations 0.235 0.119 1.969 0.049 1.265
Mkt domestic -0.188 0.098 -1.914 0.056 0.828
Customer is MNE 0.649 0.283 2.293 0.022 1.915
   
Note: The McFadden R2 is .217. For a summary of the model, see Appendix C. 
 
 
Table 2. – Preferred logit regression explaining technology transfer from buyers 
      
xi Bi S.E. z-Statistic Sig. Exp(Bi) 
   
Constant -2.034 0.578 -3.516 0.000 0.131
TTS 1.205 0.270 3.792 0.000 2.786
ECR -0.340 0.279 -1.222 0.222 0.711
ERC -0.284 0.340 -0.836 0.403 0.753
   
Complexity -0.056 0.122 -0.459 0.647 0.946
Rivals foreign -0.412 0.267 -1.544 0.123 0.662
R&D -0.017 0.273 -0.062 0.951 0.983
Upgrade 0.884 0.103 8.553 0.000 2.421
   
Part of MNE -0.987 0.308 -3.202 0.001 0.373
Good relations 0.187 0.123 -1.523 0.128 0.823
Customer is MNE 0.923 0.295 3.125 0.002 2.517
   
Note: The McFadden R2 is .277. For a summary of the model, see Appendix D. 
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Table 3 – Preferred logit regressions explaining occurrence of ERS 
 TTS = 0  TTS = 1 
xi Bi Sig.  Bi Sig. 
   
Constant -3.693 .072 -2.175 0.164
ESR 3.649 0.000 1.256 0.065
Complexity 0.200 0.582 -0.176 0.588
CustSuppliers 1.761 0.045 0.763 0.234
MktROW -0.769 0.025 -0.345 0.133
RivalDom 2.446 0.022 -0.691 0.518
SourceDom 
SourceMix 
1.927 
[-.393 
0.038
0.600]
[0.414 
-1.210 
0.593]
0.083
TTC -1.613 0.068 0.442 0.582
ERC 0.515 0.549 1.396 0.049
ECR -0.680 0.444 1.625 0.031
   
Note: Sample sizes: 218 for TTS = 0; 193 for TTS = 1. McFadden R2 are 0.443 and 0.345 
respectively. Note that there are only 13 and 18 occurrences of ERS = 1 in the two samples. 
Variables SourceDom and SourceMix enter significantly in each of the regressions but due to 
multicollinearity not at the same time. For ease of comparison the estimate in brackets indicate 
what happens if the significant variable is replaced by the other variable.  For a summary of 
the models, see Appendix E. 
 
 
Table 4. – Preferred logit regressions explaining occurrence of ECR 
 TTC = 0  TTC = 1 
xi Bi Sig.  Bi Sig. 
   
Constant -1.267 0.050 -1.768 0.005
ERC 1.305 0.002 1.815 0.000
ESR [2.124 0.000] [0.735 0.030]
Complexity 0.286 0.067 0.011 0.931
CustAssemblers -0.546 0.137 0.544 0.122
MarketDom 0.014 0.919 0.237 0.044
MNE -0.590 0.155 -0.663 0.059
   
Note: Sample sizes: 160 for TTC = 0; 249 for TTC = 1. McFadden R2  are 0.080 and 0.127, 
respectively.  ECR increases with the presence of ERC or ESR, but not both, due to 
collinearity. The ESR coefficients reported in brackets are not part of the regression but result 
when ESR replaces ECR in the model. For a summary of the models, see Appendix F. 
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Appendix A: The qustionnaire 
 
Questionnaire for Car Component Suppliers 
 
Purpose 
To understand the existence, frequency, and effect of vertical restraints in the car component supplier industry. 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1 Product and sales 
 
1.1 What do you produce? 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
1.2 Please indicate how well the following statement describes the nature of your product: 
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
 
 “Our product is highly complex and technical.”  [  ] 
 
1.3 What are your major markets? (Please rank in order of importance: 1>2>3>4>5.) 
Domestic  [  ] 
CEEC&CIS  [  ] 
EU   [  ] 
Other OECD  [  ] 
Rest of world  [  ] 
 
2 Ownership 
 
2.1 Domestic   [  ] 
Foreign    [  ] 
Mixed    [  ] 
(Please tick as appropriate.) 
 
2.2 Are you part of a multinational firm? Yes [  ] 
      No [  ] 
 
2.2.1 If yes, in which country is this firm headquartered? 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3 Competition and market structure 
 
3.1 Where are your main competitors? 
At home  [  ] 
Abroad  [  ] 
Both  [  ] 
(Please tick as appropriate.) 
 
3.2 Please indicate how well the following statements describe your business environment: 
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
a) “Domestic competition is intense.” [  ] 
b) “Global competition is intense.” [  ] 
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4 Value chain 
 
4.1 Inputs 
4.1.1 What do you source? 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4.1.2 From whom do you source? 
Domestic suppliers [  ] 
Foreign suppliers  [  ] 
Both   [  ] 
 
4.1.3 Please indicate how well the following statement describes your business environment: 
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
a) “Capabilities and competence of suppliers are high.”  [  ] 
b) “Relationships between suppliers and buyers are strong.” [  ] 
 
4.2 Output 
4.2.1 Who buys your product? 
(Please tick as appropriate.) 
Other suppliers  [  ] 
Final assemblers  [  ] 
Retailers  [  ] 
 
4.2.2 Are there MNEs among your customers?  Yes [  ] 
       No [  ] 
 
4.2.2.1 If yes, in which country are they headquartered? 
  ………………………………………………………………………………… 
5 Vertical restraints 
 
5.1 Do (some of) your customers request that you not sell to their competitors? 
 Yes [  ] 
  No [  ] 
5.2 Do you request that (some of) your customers not buy your product from alternative suppliers? 
Yes [  ] 
  No [  ] 
5.3 Do  (some of) your suppliers request that you not purchase their product from other suppliers? 
  Yes [  ] 
  No [  ] 
5.4 Do you request that (some of) your suppliers not sell their product to your competitors? 
  Yes [  ] 
  No [  ] 
6 Technology 
 
6.1 Do you undertake R&D? Yes [  ] 
    No [  ] 
 
6.2 Do you pass on technology and/or knowledge to your suppliers?  Yes [  ] 
          No [  ] 
 
6.3 Do you receive technology and/or knowledge from your buyers?  Yes [  ] 
          No [  ] 
6.4 Please indicate how well the following statements describe technology transfer with your buyers: 
(1= strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
a) “The technology transfer allows us to upgrade what we make and how we make it.” [  ] 
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Appendix  B: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
Table B.1 – Descriptive statistics of the questionnaire-based database 
      
Questions Number of 
observations 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
deviation 
 
Complexity 
 
413 1 5
 
3.50 1.10
Export share 311 0 100 43.82 35.99
 
Ownership 
Domestic 413 0 1 .62 .48
Foreign 413 0 1 .26 .44
Mixed 413 0 1 .12 .32
Part of MNE 412 0 1 .28 .45
 
Value chain 
  
Source…   
…at home 413 0 1 .16 .37
…abroad 413 0 1 .16 .37
…both 413 0 1 .68 .47
Sell to…   
…suppliers 413 0 2 .48 .51
…assemblers 413 0 4 .76 .46
…retailers 413 0 1 .43 .50
…MNEs 413 0 1 .71 .45
 
Exclusivity (see Figure 1) 
ECR 411 0 1 .36 .48
ERC 413 0 1 .19 .40
ESR 413 0 1 .19 .39
ERS 413 0 1 .08 .26
 
Technology transfer 
Do R&D? 413 0 2 .64 .49
TT…   
…to supplier 413 0 1 .47 .50
…from buyer 413 0 1 .61 .49
…important? 413 1 5 3.36 1.44
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Table B.2 – Correlation coefficients between exclusive agreement and technology 
transfer 
       
Pearson 
Correlation 
ECR ERC ESR ERS TTS TTC 
 
 
ECR 
Significance 
N 
 
1.000  
. 
412 
 
**     .310
.000
412
**     .219
.000
412
**     .185
.000
412
 
-.035 
.481 
412 
-.034
.497
412
ERC 
Significance 
N  
**      .310 
.000 
412 
 
1.000
.
414
**     .410
.000
414
.020
.687
414
.020 
.687 
414 
-.023
.644
414
ESR 
Significance 
N 
**      .219  
.000 
412 
 
**     .410
.000
414
1.000
.
414
**     .359
.000
414
.087 
.076 
414 
.013
.793
414
ERS 
Significance 
N 
**     .185 
.000 
412 
 
**     .302
.000
414
**     .359
.000
414
1.000
.
414
.065 
.189 
414 
-.036
.464
414
TTS 
Significance 
N 
-.035 
.481 
412 
 
.020
.687
414
.087
.076
414
.065
.189
414
1.000 
. 
414 
**     .301
.000
414
TTC 
Significance 
N 
-.034 
.497 
412 
-.023
.644
414
.013
.793
414
-.036
.464
414
**     .301 
.000 
414 
1.000
.
414
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
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Appendix C: Logit regression explaining technology transfer to suppliers (TTS) 
 
Dependent Variable: TTS 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Date: 07/23/02   Time: 11:34 
Sample(adjusted): 1 439 
Included observations: 409 
Excluded observations: 30 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -2.451000 0.845602 -2.898528 0.0037 
TTC 1.112447 0.281143 3.956865 0.0001 
ESR 0.500213 0.317399 1.575974 0.1150 
ERS 0.453433 0.491047 0.923400 0.3558 
COMPLEXITY 0.181221 0.113889 1.591206 0.1116 
COMPDOM -0.128235 0.090980 -1.409487 0.1587 
COMPGLOBAL -0.127035 0.119060 -1.066980 0.2860 
RD 1.431300 0.263010 5.441997 0.0000 
UPGRADE 0.172933 0.100774 1.716047 0.0862 
MNE 0.753028 0.291588 2.582503 0.0098 
SOURCEFOR -0.880201 0.348695 -2.524269 0.0116 
GOODSUPPLIERS -0.219755 0.125279 -1.754134 0.0794 
GOODRELATIONS 0.235052 0.119399 1.968629 0.0490 
MKTDOM -0.188455 0.098458 -1.914061 0.0556 
CUSTMNE 0.649466 0.283229 2.293074 0.0218 
Mean dependent var 0.469438     S.D. dependent var 0.499676 
S.E. of regression 0.436073     Akaike info criterion 1.155278 
Sum squared resid 74.92300     Schwarz criterion 1.302480 
Log likelihood -221.2543     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.213520 
Restr. log likelihood -282.7327     Avg. log likelihood -0.540964 
LR statistic (14 df) 122.9568     McFadden R-squared 0.217444 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000    
Obs with Dep=0 217      Total obs 409 
Obs with Dep=1 192    
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Appendix D: Logit regression explaining technology transfer from customers 
(TTC) 
 
Dependent Variable: TTC 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Date: 07/23/02   Time: 14:18 
Sample(adjusted): 1 439 
Included observations: 409 
Excluded observations: 30 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -2.033601 0.578448 -3.515617 0.0004 
TTS 1.024659 0.270244 3.791602 0.0001 
ECR -0.340463 0.278614 -1.221989 0.2217 
ERC -0.284109 0.339847 -0.835993 0.4032 
COMPLEXITY -0.055849 0.121790 -0.458572 0.6465 
RIVALFOR -0.412157 0.266938 -1.544018 0.1226 
RD -0.016958 0.273303 -0.062048 0.9505 
UPGRADE 0.884499 0.103410 8.553323 0.0000 
CUSTMNE 0.922971 0.295374 3.124757 0.0018 
MNE -0.986513 0.308080 -3.202135 0.0014 
GOODRELATIONS -0.186896 0.122684 -1.523399 0.1277 
Mean dependent var 0.608802     S.D. dependent var 0.488616 
S.E. of regression 0.404811     Akaike info criterion 1.021623 
Sum squared resid 65.22114     Schwarz criterion 1.129571 
Log likelihood -197.9219     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.064334 
Restr. log likelihood -273.7359     Avg. log likelihood -0.483917 
LR statistic (10 df) 151.6280     McFadden R-squared 0.276960 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000    
Obs with Dep=0 160      Total obs 409 
Obs with Dep=1 249    
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Appendix E: Logit regressions explaining exclusivity requested by the 
respondent and granted by the supplier (ERS) 
E.1 TTS = 0 
Dependent Variable: ERS 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Date: 07/23/02   Time: 14:12 
Sample(adjusted): 5 439 IF TTS = 0 
Included observations: 218 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -3.693164 2.049465 -1.802013 0.0715 
ESR 3.648818 0.964781 3.782017 0.0002 
COMPLEXITY 0.200405 0.364455 0.549876 0.5824 
CUSTSUPPLIERS 1.760973 0.880058 2.000973 0.0454 
MKTROW -0.768729 0.342129 -2.246894 0.0246 
RIVALDOM 2.446404 1.064474 2.298227 0.0215 
SOURCEDOM 1.926935 0.927559 2.077426 0.0378 
TTC -1.613037 0.884947 -1.822749 0.0683 
ERC 0.514789 0.858910 0.599351 0.5489 
ECR -0.679946 0.888787 -0.765027 0.4443 
Mean dependent var 0.059633     S.D. dependent var 0.237351 
S.E. of regression 0.192704     Akaike info criterion 0.343246 
Sum squared resid 7.724017     Schwarz criterion 0.498498 
Log likelihood -27.41377     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.405954 
Restr. log likelihood -49.25854     Avg. log likelihood -0.125751 
LR statistic (9 df) 43.68953     McFadden R-squared 0.443472 
Probability(LR stat) 1.61E-06    
Obs with Dep=0 205      Total obs 218 
Obs with Dep=1 13    
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E.2 TTS = 1 
 
Dependent Variable: ERS 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Date: 07/23/02   Time: 14:12 
Sample(adjusted): 1 437 IF TTS = 1 
Included observations: 193 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -2.875325 1.535739 -1.872275 0.0612 
ESR 1.215165 0.663338 1.831893 0.0670 
COMPLEXITY -0.262694 0.310527 -0.845960 0.3976 
CUSTSUPPLIERS 0.568175 0.608749 0.933349 0.3506 
MKTROW -0.306708 0.224839 -1.364124 0.1725 
RIVALDOM -0.352112 1.029094 -0.342157 0.7322 
SOURCEDOM 0.414206 0.774670 0.534688 0.5929 
TTC 0.554526 0.792476 0.699738 0.4841 
ERC 1.550892 0.681542 2.275563 0.0229 
ECR 1.473166 0.721288 2.042410 0.0411 
Mean dependent var 0.093264     S.D. dependent var 0.291559 
S.E. of regression 0.255373     Akaike info criterion 0.523979 
Sum squared resid 11.93439     Schwarz criterion 0.693031 
Log likelihood -40.56401     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.592440 
Restr. log likelihood -59.83497     Avg. log likelihood -0.210176 
LR statistic (9 df) 38.54192     McFadden R-squared 0.322069 
Probability(LR stat) 1.39E-05    
Obs with Dep=0 175      Total obs 193 
Obs with Dep=1 18    
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Appendix F: Logit regressions explaining exclusivity requested by the 
customer and granted by the respondent (ECR) 
F.1 TTC = 0 
Dependent Variable: ECR 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Date: 07/25/02   Time: 20:38 
Sample(adjusted): 3 439 IF TTC = 0 
Included observations: 161 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -1.266549 0.647221 -1.956902 0.0504 
ERC 1.305764 0.424935 3.072856 0.0021 
COMPLEXITY 0.286226 0.156151 1.833005 0.0668 
CUSTASSEMBLERS -0.546470 0.367375 -1.487499 0.1369 
MKTDOM 0.013984 0.137918 0.101397 0.9192 
MNE -0.589899 0.415050 -1.421271 0.1552 
Mean dependent var 0.385093     S.D. dependent var 0.488136 
S.E. of regression 0.469835     Akaike info criterion 1.300446 
Sum squared resid 34.21551     Schwarz criterion 1.415280 
Log likelihood -98.68587     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.347073 
Restr. log likelihood -107.3069     Avg. log likelihood -0.612956 
LR statistic (5 df) 17.24208     McFadden R-squared 0.080340 
Probability(LR stat) 0.004063    
Obs with Dep=0 99      Total obs 161 
Obs with Dep=1 62    
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F.2 TTC = 1 
Dependent Variable: ECR 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Date: 07/23/02   Time: 12:23 
Sample(adjusted): 1 437 IF TTC = 1 
Included observations: 249 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -1.868895 0.769759 -2.427898 0.0152 
ERC 1.856177 0.377420 4.918067 0.0000 
COMPLEXITY 0.027427 0.140427 0.195313 0.8451 
CUSTASSEMBLERS 0.578458 0.354617 1.631219 0.1028 
GOODSUPPLIERS 0.068586 0.147141 0.466124 0.6411 
MKTDOM 0.241871 0.123291 1.961796 0.0498 
MNE -0.693249 0.366019 -1.894026 0.0582 
SOURCEFOR 0.009077 0.450748 0.020139 0.9839 
RD -0.355276 0.314870 -1.128327 0.2592 
Mean dependent var 0.349398     S.D. dependent var 0.477740 
S.E. of regression 0.441034     Akaike info criterion 1.196335 
Sum squared resid 46.68269     Schwarz criterion 1.323472 
Log likelihood -139.9437     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.247510 
Restr. log likelihood -161.1212     Avg. log likelihood -0.562023 
LR statistic (8 df) 42.35490     McFadden R-squared 0.131438 
Probability(LR stat) 1.16E-06    
Obs with Dep=0 162      Total obs 249 
Obs with Dep=1 87    
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Appendix G:  
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW WITH 
SELECT CAR COMPONENT SUPPLIERS (OR THEIR CUSTOMERS)8 
 
Purpose 
 
To understand 
• in what way complexity, technology transfer, and vertical restraints are (or are not) related 
• how firms bargain about exclusive agreements 
• what determines each firm’s bargaining position 
• to what extent the (efficiency) gains resulting from the interaction between firms remain 
exclusive to the directly involved parties, spill-over to other firms, and/or are passed on to 
consumers. 
 
  
A Complexity 
 
1. What does the complexity of the product consist of? 
2. Where does the international technology frontier lie in this product area? Who drives it 
(i.e. who are the main players)? Where is innovation most likely to come from in this 
area? [To frame your questions please make use of the background material about 
individual product categories in the FT survey on the automotive supply industry.] 
3. How distant are you from this frontier? Why? What is your best bet of bridging the gap? 
 
 
B Technology transfer 
 
I. If you are a technology transfer recipient… 
1. … what exactly is being transferred? 
2. … does it upgrade what you make (product), how you make it (process), or something 
else? 
3. … is the upgrade incremental (i.e. based on your previous capabilities) or does it introduce 
a genuinely new competence? 
4. … could you have (easily) acquired this technology on the open market? 
5. … did you produce this or a similar technology even prior to the transfer from your 
partner? 
 
1. If you are not a technology transfer recipient… 
1. …why not? 
                                                           
8 Only interview an assembler if you have one of its suppliers among your other case studies. 
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Note: Sections C-D only for firms who have VRs in place. 
 
 
C Vertical restraints 
 
1. What does the VR consist of (i.e. what does the agreement say: scope, sanctions etc.)?  
How long is it valid for? 
2. Why did you consent to an exclusive agreement? 
3. Are you familiar with regulations concerning VRs in your country/in the EU? 
4. Did you notify any authorities about the VR? If no, why not? If yes, how did they react? 
 
 
D Bargaining 
 
1. Is the agreement a standard contract specific only to the relationship in question (i.e. 
supplier to firm X must not sell to anyone else), or does it reflect your own situation as a 
manufacturer in terms of where you source from; who you sell to; who and where your 
competitors are; who and where your VR-party’s competitors are? 
2. Did you negotiate the agreement or did you just sign up to it? Did you change any of its 
provisions? Which? 
3. Did you have problems (financial or otherwise) when you agreed to the VR? 
4. Were you familiar with VRs or was this your first exclusive agreement? 
 
 
E Gains from relationship 
 
1. Has the relationship with your partner (i.e. the firm that imposes a VR, transfers 
technology, or both) improved what you make and how you make it, or how you get your 
product to the (which) market(s)? Has it broadened your value-added scope? 
2. Have you become more productive? 
3. Have you become more profitable? 
4. Have you lowered prices? If yes, who benefited from this? 
5. Has the relationship with your partner changed your relationships with other suppliers or 
customers? In what way? 
